

Green (Jas. D.)

AN

ADDRESS,

DELIVERED AT THE

ANNIVERSARY CELEBRATION

OF

THE BIRTH OF SPURZHEIM,

AND

THE ORGANIZATION OF

THE

BOSTON PHRENOLOGICAL SOCIETY,

DECEMBER 30, 1836.

BY JAMES D. GREEN.

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ADDRESS.

Gentlemen of the Phrenological Society,—

To commemorate the birth of those, who have been distinguished as benefactors of our race, is accordant with the noblest feelings of our nature. It is one mode, most common, and least exceptionable, of rendering public homage to their worth. Hereby we give expression to our feelings of gratitude for the benefits they have conferred ; at a time when they are beyond the reach of our praise. In this way, too, we recal, to a vivid recollection, the labors they have performed, the toils they have undergone, the talents they have put forth, and the virtues they have displayed ; — and thus we find incitement to imbibe their spirit, and, as far as in us lies, to emulate their example.

Had you never known, Gentlemen, nor seen the individual, whose bust there stands before you, displaying the impress of a countenance, that beamed, while living, with benevolence, intelligence, and truth,—still it would have been right and proper for you, had you been believers in his science, to express your obligations by public rites. How much more so, when it was your favored fortune to receive from his lips, — may I not say his dying lips ?—the doctrines of a new and improved philosophy ! You personally knew him ; you loved him ; you respected him. It is grateful to cherish his remembrance.

Impressed by the evidence he exhibited in proof of his science, and by that zeal in its propagation, which a conviction of truth could alone inspire ;— a zeal, which no opposition could overcome, no labors tire, no ill-returns discourage ;— a zeal, to which, while yet in all the fulness of his vigor, and, as he was just entering on a new field of usefulness, he fell the sacrifice ;— you associated to aid each other in the investigation of the system ;— and you chose the anniversary of Spurzheim's birth as the fit occasion for the organization of your society. Thus was falsified the prediction that Phrenology would expire with its founders. The founders are dead ;— but their philosophy survives, and has gathered, like Christianity, new life and strength from the tomb.

The occasion, therefore, Gentlemen, on which I have been invited to address you, is one of two-fold character, and two-fold interest. And I know not how otherwise I could do it better justice, than by presenting to your attention some remarks upon the claims of Phrenology to be regarded as a *Science*, and upon a few of its important bearings on the welfare of our race. It has assumed the name of a *Science* in the writings of its expounders, and we ought to satisfy ourselves in regard to the ground of the assumption.

I do not propose, — it would of course be impossible on an occasion like the present—to exhibit the physiological proof of the truth of Phrenology. I shall aim only to indicate the method that has been pursued in conducting its investigations. This will enable us to form some judgment in regard to its claims.

What is understood by a science ? In its comprehensive signification, the term means *knowledge* ; but in the more restricted sense which usage sanctions, it denotes *systematic knowledge*,—*knowledge reduced to a system*. The sciences have commonly been divided into three classes ;—those which relate to number, and figure, and quantity, which are based on the demonstrations of mathematics, and are called the exact sciences ; those which relate to matter, which are based on

observation and experiment, and are called natural philosophy, and those which relate to the mind, the understanding and the will, the intellect and the affections, which are based on individual consciousness, and are called metaphysics and ethics; or, in other words, intellectual and moral philosophy. To my understanding, this division of the sciences is unphilosophical. A more just division, as I conceive, would be into two great classes; those which are founded on *mathematical demonstration*, and those which are founded on *observation and experiment*.

Intellectual philosophy, as it has been taught in the schools, and founded on individual consciousness, possesses no title to rank as a science, and, least of all, to constitute a science of a distinct class. Instead of being *knowledge*, it is still mere *theory*, altogether unsettled, various and conflicting in its elements, as expounded by different writers, and without any verification by an examination of nature. Intellectual philosophy, in time past, has made no progress, in comparison with other departments of scientific inquiry. Yet gigantic minds have laid out their strength upon it. They have had the misfortune to overlook the only true mode of investigating the mental phenomena.

The true mode of conducting inquiry in the pursuit of knowledge was first pointed out by Lord Bacon. The minds of men, until his time, had yielded profound homage to the Aristotelian philosophy. But the spell of enchantment was broken by the publication of his *Novum Organum Scientiarum*; the new method of studying the sciences; and the world was delivered from an intellectual bondage of two thousand years. Göethe says, "He drew a sponge over the table of human knowledge." Bacon was not himself the founder of a sect. His object was attained when he had discovered and pointed out the way, by which future inquirers should be guided to the truth. This was enough to be accomplished by a single mind. It procured for him the enviable distinction of being known, through all after time, as the "Father of the Experimental Philosophy."

His great principle of inquiry has been called the "*Inductive Method*;" i. e. the method of *bringing in*, or collecting facts, making experiments and observations of nature. General truths are to be established only by an induction of facts.

This great principle was at once applied in physical investigations; and lo! how surprising was the result! A total revolution was effected in natural philosophy. Instead of a jargon of unmeaning terms to stand for occult qualities and imaginary essences, about which there was not one clear conception in the mind, the attention was directed to the observation of facts and the classification of phenomena; and the investigation of causes was abandoned as a fruitless endeavor.

Contemporary with Bacon were other kindred spirits,—Galileo, Kepler, and Gassendi,—who were looking for redemption from the intellectual darkness and scholastic bondage of the times. To pursue the inductive method, they needed but its indication. Discovery was made upon discovery, improvement followed improvement, in quick succession. The laws of matter and of motion were faithfully investigated by these students of nature; and physics made a rapid advancement to the dignity of an established science. Newton was thus placed upon a vantage-ground for making his great discoveries. Availing himself of Bacon's inductive method, of Galileo's improvements in the telescope, and of Kepler's laws of motion, he was enabled to demonstrate the forces which impel and control the celestial bodies; whereby the true planetary system was established, and the science of Astronomy was carried to such perfection, as to constitute the proudest monument that has been reared by the human intellect. Similar success attended the application of the Baconian method in other departments of natural science.

Contrast with this the condition of mental philosophy. Here no experiment was made of the same method. Two hundred years were destined to elapse before the appearance of the individual, who should possess the judgment and the independence to apply it in the investigations of the mental phenomena. The metaphysician continued still to speculate in the old way.

He studied *the human mind* by reflecting on *his own*, in the retirement of his closet; and as though it had no connexions or dependencies of a material nature.

In consequence of this procedure, how various and conflicting are the systems of mental philosophy! On the one hand, we behold the *ideal system*, commencing with Des Cartes and Locke, who overturned the scholastic metaphysics so long in vogue. The former built all philosophy on the consciousness of thought; — the latter attempted to found it upon experience, — yet failed in the true method of ascertaining that experience. Terms which he had used incautiously, not anticipating their liability to misapplication, served as the foundation, first, for the philosophy of Berkeley, which annihilated the material world, and next for that of Hume, which swept away, by a universal scepticism, every thing from existence, but his own ideas and impressions.

That this philosophy, so utterly at war with common sense, and the first principles of our nature, has resulted from the neglect of the method of Lord Bacon in the study of mind, — that it has derived its origin from solitary study in the closet, — is ingenuously acknowledged by Hume. “It was only in solitude and retirement, that he could yield any assent to his own philosophy; — society, like day-light, dispelled the darkness and fogs of scepticism, and made him yield to the dominion of common sense.’” “Fortunately,” says Hume, “since reason is incapable of dispelling these clouds, nature herself suffices for that purpose, and cures me of this philosophical delirium.”

How remarkable is the following confession, which Hume put on record, in the first edition of his *Treatise on Human Nature*; but which he afterwards expunged: — “I am affrighted and confounded with that forlorn solitude, in which I am placed in my philosophy. When I look abroad, I foresee, on every side, dispute, contradiction, and detraction. When I turn my eye inward, I find nothing but doubt and ignorance. *Where am I? — or what?* From what causes do I derive my existence; — and to what condition shall I return?

I am confounded with these questions, and begin to fancy myself in the most deplorable condition imaginable, environed with the deepest darkness." *

A profound writer has justly remarked, that, "It is a bold philosophy, that rejects without ceremony principles which irresistibly govern the belief and conduct of all mankind, in the common concerns of life ; and to which the philosopher himself must yield, after he imagines he hath confuted them. Such principles are older and of more authority than philosophy ;—*she* rests upon *THEM* as *her* BASIS ; not *THEY* upon *her*." †

Such was the legitimate result of the philosophy of Des Cartes and Locke. From this a natural revulsion followed. It began with Reid in Scotland, and with Kant in Prussia. The Scotch philosopher attempted an analysis of the mental operations, in order to establish those original principles of belief, which serve as the ground-work of human knowledge. His enumeration and description of the faculties of the mind are greatly erroneous ;—mere abstractions and modes of activity being taken for primitive powers. He did, however, important service, in effecting the overthrow of the ideal system, and enforcing the appeal to common sense. With some deviations, Dugald Stewart, not a profound or original thinker, pursued the method and principles of his master. To him succeeded Dr. Thomas Brown, whose metaphysics, in fundamental particulars, is at total variance with the Scotch school ; and comes the nearest to what we regard as the true philosophy of the human mind. Its defects and inconsistencies, however, are many and radical. For some years past, the popularity of Brown is said to have been declining ; and little interest is felt, in Great Britain, in subjects of metaphysical inquiry.

In German philosophy, we see the manifestation of a bolder and freer thought. Its basis, however, is abstract speculation ;—and not the observation of nature. It commenced with Kant, who aimed to establish the certainty of knowledge, by reason-

* Treat. of Human Nature, Ed. 1739, Vol. I. pp. 458, sq.

† Reid, I. 185.

ing *a priori* ;— by adopting certain principles as primary laws of the understanding, from the fancied consciousness of their necessity, antecedent to all experience. The principles he adopted were such as he conceived to *transcend* experience, and therefore were dignified with the name *transcendental*. “ I call all knowledge *transcendental*,” says Kant, “ which occupies itself, not so much with *objects*, as with *the way of knowing* these objects, as far as this is possible *a priori*. A system of such notions would be called *transcendental philosophy*, and would be the system of all the principles of pure reason ;” — “ the philosophy of the *pure*, merely *speculative reason*, from which the practical is separated.”

Fichte first founded his system on the philosophy of Kant ; but subsequently deviated ; and at length settled down in pure *Idealism* ;— regarding every thing external to the mind as the mind’s own creation. The world of matter, he conceived, is a mere illusion.

Another system of German philosophy is that of Schelling, whose mental process seems the reverse of the preceding, — commencing with the “ *objective absolute*,” and from this coming to the idea of individual existence. Knowledge he bases on intellectual intuition ; and he divides it into two classes, styled *objective* and *subjective* ; a distinction not very clearly ascertained, and for which we shall look in vain to find a foundation in nature.

How utterly profitless are such speculations ! As yet there is no consistency in German metaphysics. Her Intellectual Philosophy is altogether unsettled. As for France, — she cannot be said to have any system properly her own. She is fluctuating between the spiritualism of Germany on the one hand, and the views of the Scotch school on the other. The same remark will apply to the philosophy of our own country.

In confirmation of the view I have now presented, I will adduce the testimony of a distinguished French Academician, M. de Bonald, (in his *Recherches Philosophiques*,) whose words, as quoted by Dugald Stewart, are as follows :—

"The *Comparative History of Philosophical Systems* is nothing else than a *History of the Variations* of philosophical schools, leaving no other impression upon the reader than an insurmountable disgust at all philosophical researches; and a demonstrated conviction of the impossibility of raising an edifice on a soil so void of consistency, and so completely surrounded by the most frightful precipices. About what then are philosophers agreed? What single point have they placed beyond the reach of dispute? Plato and Aristotle inquired, What is science?—What is knowledge? And we, so many ages after these fathers of philosophy; we, so proud of the progress of human reason, still continue to repeat the same questions; vainly pursuing the same phantoms which the Greeks pursued two thousand years ago." "The diversity of doctrines," he says, "has increased, from age to age, with the number of masters, and with the progress of knowledge; and Europe, which at present possesses libraries filled with philosophical works, and which reckons up almost as many philosophers as writers;—poor in the midst of so much riches, and uncertain, with the aid of all its guides, which road it should follow;—Europe, the centre and the focus of all the lights of the world, has yet its *philosophy* only in expectation."*

I have thus endeavored to evince, that I have not brought an accusation without warrant against the common metaphysics, — as being altogether unsettled, unsatisfactory, the product of solitary speculation in the closet, not founded on an examination of nature, on the observation of fact. We see that it was not without justice that Dugald Stewart acknowledged that the "discussions, which abound in the writings of most metaphysical authors," are "frivolous, and absurd;" and that he had ground for his conclusion, that this was the cause of the "*contempt*," into which he complained that *metaphysical speculations* had fallen.

Equally various and unsatisfactory are the systems of moral philosophy. Some maintain that moral sentiments are inscrib-

* Stewart's Works, VI. 435, sq.

ed by nature on the hearts of all; others, that such sentiments are entirely the result of education. The French philosophers referred their origin to the priests. Writers upon ethics have been continually debating the nature of virtue, and the theory of right. Do any of them settle the question, what constitutes right? or, what is that quality in actions, which excites our moral approbation? One says, it is the tendency of an action to promote the *good of the agent*, — the *good of one's self*, — that makes it right. This is the *selfish* system. Another says, it is the *general utility* of the action that gives it its virtuous character; — i. e. its tendency to promote the *greatest good of the whole*. This is the theory of the *Utilitarian*; the *Benthamic*; “the *greatest happiness of the greatest number*.” A third says, it is *the conformity of an action to the will of God*, which makes it right. And a fourth maintains, that an action is right, because it *possesses an intrinsic beauty, a propriety, an inherent fitness*, which conforms to a certain *fitness* there is in *things*.

Nor is there any better agreement among writers on morals, in regard to that part of our constitution, by which we are informed of what is right. One says, it is by *sympathy*; another, that it is by the *understanding*; and a third, that it is by a *moral sense*. Amidst such a conflict of opinions, how great is the need of a true basis for morals!

Now, how are we to account for the extraordinary fact, that, while other departments of human inquiry have been long since carried to a high degree of certainty and perfection, there is so little, that can be regarded as absolutely settled by metaphysicians and moralists, in regard to the intellectual and moral nature of man? Minds, as sagacious as any that have adorned humanity, have been applied to the task, and we should suppose, that, in that direction, “the force of nature could no further go.” Here is to be found the answer. The only true and certain method of investigation has been overlooked. To nature they have not appealed. They have attempted to study the human mind as though it were a pure disembodied spirit,

having no connexion with, or dependence on, a material organization for the performance of its functions. In solitude they have given themselves up to reflection upon consciousness, and have assumed individual consciousness to be the representative of the consciousness of man universally. The speculative philosopher goes into his study, and reflects upon the operations and feelings of his own mind. These he assumes as universal phenomena. What he finds in his mind, he presumes to be in all minds; and he comes out to the world with his *philosophy of the human mind*.

Hence it is, that there are such various and conflicting systems of mental and moral philosophy. Hence it is, that one philosopher says, "*There is a moral sense. I feel it, — my consciousness testifies to its existence; ergo, mankind have a moral sense.*" Another says, — "*I do not feel it; there is none; it is a fiction of the imagination. These moral distinctions have no foundation in nature; they are to be referred entirely to the nursery.*" It would be quite as philosophical for a blind man to make the inference, *that there is no light*. Men have mistaken their reflections on the mind for universal mental philosophy.

If we would attain a true knowledge of human nature, we must pursue the same strict mode of inductive reasoning, in regard to the phenomena of the intellectual and moral creation, that has been attended with such signal success in physical science. Our conclusions must be based on fact; on experiment and observation of nature. In this way only can we expect to attain a determinate science. A determinate science is the same all the world over. The sciences of Mathematics, Geometry, Astronomy, Optics, Chemistry, Botany, Physiology, are the same, when investigated, every where. Not only are the *relations and properties of number and of figure universal*; — the same is true of the *laws of matter and of motion*. There is no exception to nature's laws. Does not the intellectual and moral constitution of man, I ask, fall within the dominion of nature? Are there no such things as established

laws for the mind of man ? — laws which are as universal and as invariable in their operation, as the laws of matter and of motion ? — Why should a different method be pursued in investigating their phenomena ?

It was reserved for Gall and Spurzheim to make the first application, in the study of human nature, of the same inductive process, which had been so successfully applied in physics. The founders of Phrenology had deeply imbibed the spirit of the Baconian philosophy. It every where breathes through their works. The first sentence of the *Organum* of Bacon is as follows ; — “ Man, the servant and interpreter of nature, understands and reduces to practice just so much as he has actually experienced of nature’s laws. More he can neither know nor do.” How much akin to it is the sentiment that follows ! “ Man will be happy, when he confines himself to understand the laws of his Creator, and to find out the means of putting them into execution.”

† According to the principle which is here expressed, the Phrenologist applies himself to the study of human nature. He begins, by regarding himself, not as the standard of universal man, but as possessing a distinct individuality. He forbears to draw general conclusions from a single case. He takes care not to mistake his *idiosyncrasies* for common attributes of humanity. He observes other individuals, and ascertains his facts both by positive and negative proof. His observation is directed to every period of life, from infancy and childhood, through the various situations, occupations, and professions of men, in which every variety and modification of individual talent and character may be called into exercise. From individuals he proceeds to sexes, and notes their characteristic differences. He studies human nature in all the modes of its manifestation, as it may be learned in the school ; in the hospital ; in the almshouse ; in the prison ; in the asylum for the deaf and dumb, the blind, the insane, and the idiotic. From classes he proceeds to the observation of nations and races of man, and marks their distinctive peculiarities. How vast is the field

to be explored by him, who would be a profound student in the science of man's nature ! But the observation of such a student does not terminate here ; — it must extend even beyond the human race to the animal kingdom ; that thus his conclusions may be further ascertained by the demonstrations of comparative anatomy, and the broad distinction found and marked between the human, spiritual, immortal, — and the brutal, earthly, perishable. Having made these extensive observations, the Phrenologist feels authorised to regard his conclusions as established, unless opposing facts are produced, or an error is pointed out in his induction.

On the ground of this procedure, the Phrenologist conceives that he makes out *the title of his science* ; — that he establishes its claims to be regarded as the *true philosophy of human nature*.

“ It is not in the mere knowledge, nor even in the discovery of facts, that philosophy consists. One who proceeds thus far is an experimentalist ; but he alone, who, by examining the nature, and observing the relation of facts, arrives at general truths, is a philosopher. It is, therefore, no wonder, that, amongst many experimentalists, there should be few philosophers.” *

An appeal to fact is the test of truth. By this, Phrenology will be content to stand or fall. We inquire how man *has been constituted* by his Creator ? This is the question ; not how we think beforehand he *ought to have been* constituted ; nor how we should have been pleased to *have had him* constituted ; but simply, *what is the fact* ? Now, Phrenology claims to have made the discovery. Phrenology answers the question. Do you deny it ? Then you are bound to disprove the facts. Produce the cases that are in opposition. If there be no foundation for the doctrine, you can bring as many facts against it, as are brought in its support. But the opponent will not abide this test. He shrinks from the appeal to nature. He reasons abstractly about the subject ; he misconceives and misrepresents

* Enfield, Pref. to Institutes of Nat. Phil.

its nature ; he denounces its tendency ; he attempts to excite prejudice ; he calls hard names ; but he carefully keeps clear of the only touchstone. In vain will you look to the Anti-Phrenologist to bring examples to disprove the science. So tenaciously does he cling to the old modes of conceiving of human nature, so great seems to him the difficulty, *a priori*, of admitting the system, such is the fear he entertains of its consequences, that he cannot come, like a little child, to be taught of nature. He has not learned the philosophy of Bacon.

It was a saying of Dr. Spurzheim, that "*all which can be found out by human reasoning has been found out.*" That is, reasoning is not the mode of discovering truth. It is available for purposes of proof, but it supposes the truth to be already known.

Such, then, though imperfectly represented, is the ground, on which the claims of Phrenology rest, to be ranked as a science. The name it has assumed denotes the *science of the mind* ; (*Φρηνολογος*) ; not that it pretends to treat of the *mind in itself considered* ; for of the nature of the mind we can know nothing. We have no faculties by which we can take cognizance of this. We know not, indeed, the *nature* of any thing. We do not know the *nature of matter*. We can perceive only its properties, its form, its magnitude, its color, and a few other external characteristics ; but what that substance is to which these properties belong, what is its real nature, is concealed entirely from our observation. So it is in regard to the *true nature of mind*. We cannot tell *what constitutes the mind*. We are conscious of its operations in ourselves, of its thoughts and feelings ; but of its *nature* we know nothing. As form, size, and color do not *constitute matter*, so neither do thought and feeling *constitute the mind*. They cannot exist of themselves. They imply something else, of which they are the *qualities or properties* in the one case, and the *operations or affections* in the other.

Phrenology professes to be the *Science of the mental phenomena* ; or of the *mental manifestations*. It claims to have

discovered the *laws, in accordance to which the mind acts* ; or, in other words, the *material conditions, according to which the mind is exercised and manifested*. It claims to be received as the only true basis of intellectual and moral philosophy. It urges that mind, in itself considered, apart from matter, cannot be an object of our study. It would be as wise to attempt the study of *gravity, electricity, or magnetism*, in themselves considered, and without reference to matter. Mind is connected with a material organization, and manifests itself, in this state of existence, only through a material instrumentality. How it may be in other modes of existence, whether the mind can act or not, independent of a material instrument, is altogether hypothetical. As philosophers, we are concerned only with present phenomena. We have nothing to do with theory and hypothesis.

What we affirm is this ; *the human mind, in its present state of existence, manifests itself only through a material organization*. Phrenology claims to have established with certainty the fact, — a fact which no physiologist of any name will now undertake to question, so full and conclusive is the proof,—that the *human brain is that organization*. These are the words of Blumenbach, second to no man living as a physiologist, —“ That the mind is closely connected with the brain, *as the material condition of mental phenomena*, is demonstrated by our consciousness, and by the *mental disturbances which ensue upon affections of the brain*.” *

Phrenology claims, moreover, to have demonstrated the fact, that the *several faculties of man's nature*, both of intellect and feeling, have their *respective cerebral organs*, whose *functions are distinct, and whose energy may generally be ascertained*. These are the fundamental positions. Of the nature of that connexion which exists between the mind and the several organs by which its faculties are manifested, we pretend to know nothing. We assert only the simple fact, the existence of the con-

* Blum. Elem. Ed. Elliotson, 4th Lond. p. 195.

nexion. The mind we regard as a *unit*; and the proposition we affirm is this,—that the *mind*, in the present life, is *dependent on the cerebral organization for its power of manifestation*; or, to express it more precisely, is dependent on the *several organs* for its *several modes* of manifestation. Phrenology does not affirm that the mind *results from* organization; this might indeed, with some show of reason, expose it to the charge of materialism; but, that it *acts*, or *manifests itself, through this instrumentality*.

To render it obnoxious to such a charge, the order of nature, as we conceive it, must be reversed, and mind must be shown to *result from* organization; whereas the simple truth may be, that mind exists *back of the organization*, and *uses the organized system* for its *exercise and manifestation*. Thus organization is not the *cause* of mind, but the *medium, through which the mind acts*. It is not the cause of any mental phenomena, but merely the medium through which these phenomena are displayed. The distinction appears to be perfectly plain and simple, and such as no clear and candid mind can confound.

It is true there have been those, who have conceived of the mind, as though it were a *quality*, not a thing that could have an independent existence, but a *quality*, or *property, resulting from* organization, in some manner analogous to that in which harmony results from a musical instrument. But Phrenology is not responsible for this opinion. It has no connexion whatever with it. Even John Locke, whose "*ideas*" were as remote as possible from Phrenology, has argued at great length, in a letter to the Bishop of Worcester, to prove that God may "give to matter a faculty of thinking." We conceive that the analogy referred to is extremely fallacious. It cannot stand the test of a rigid examination. Whence proceeds harmony? Is it produced by the instrument, or by the musical performer, by means of the instrument? Most certainly the latter. It is not the organ, but the performer upon it, who conceives and produces the music. So we believe it is in regard to the phe-

nomena of mind. It is not the organization, which produces the mental manifestations ; but the mind, which is back of the organization, and which manifests itself through this instrumentality. The eye does not see. The ear does not hear. It is the mind, which sees and hears through these organs. That is, in all cases, the mind exists back of the organization, and acts through it.

In the present state of existence, then, there can be no mental manifestation, but through the medium of matter. Such has been the ordinance of the Creator ; and our duty is to learn and acquiesce in his appointment. Indeed, the same may be affirmed of the Infinite Mind. He is manifested to us only through matter ; i. e. through the medium of his works. This fact should teach us caution in the use of language, derogatory to that, which he has ordained as the medium, through which his attributes are displayed. *Matter*, — though not probably inferior in its nature to mind, — is by no means to be spoken of in terms of contempt. It is the creature of God ; and is doubtless useful and necessary, in the place which has been assigned it. To speak in disparagement of any of God's works is to reproach him. To despise the *creature* is the same in criminality as to despise the *Creator*.

Matter ! — indeed, we know not what it is. It may be attenuated, to a degree infinitely beyond our conception. Light, which travels with the velocity of 195,000 miles, in a second of time, — for it is proved by the eclipses of Jupiter's Satellites to cross the orbit of the earth, 190,000,000 of miles, in sixteen minutes and a quarter, — light is affirmed by many philosophers to be *matter*. We know not how ethereal matter is capable of being in many of its forms.

On material organization, then, we are dependent for our power of mental manifestation ; deriving all the knowledge we possess of other minds from the same intermediate communication ; and recognizing the attributes of the Creator, only as displayed through the instrumentality of the material universe. The material organization is intended also, we believe, for the

mind's *exercise*, as well as *manifestation*. As the organization is developed from infancy to adult age, the mind's power of manifestation is increased in the same proportion.

Do any serious persons entertain the fear, that mind, from its intimate connexion with a material organization, may be in danger of becoming extinct, when that organization shall be dissolved? — Phrenology affirms the connexion to be *constant*, in this life, but makes no inference from this that the connexion is *necessary*. Nay; — the Phrenologist may cherish as strong a faith as any other individual, — I speak from the consciousness of my own, — in the *spirituality* of the thinking principle, and its *independence of matter, so far as its existence is concerned*. He may cherish, in perfect consistence, a strong faith, that this wonderful organization has been designed as the temporary residence of the spiritual principle, not merely for its external manifestation, but also for its discipline and improvement. He may recognize the various means and aids, with which it is supplied, to promote its intellectual and moral progress. He may believe, — doubtless he does believe, (it appertains to *faith* and not to *science*,) — that the knowledge and virtue the mind acquires here, through a material instrumentality, it will carry with it. It may be as difficult for them to be separated from the mind that possesses them, as for form or extension to be separated from matter.

The Phrenologist may believe, with as undoubting confidence as any, that the greater the progress the mind makes here, the more advanced will be the position it will occupy, when it shall awake hereafter a disembodied spirit. The mind of the infant then, at death, must go with infant capacities; but the mind of a Newton must carry with it its vast intelligence.

The Phrenologist, therefore, may cherish as strong a faith as any other individual, — there is nothing in his science inconsistent with it, — that the mind of man is a spiritual principle, in its own nature *distinct from* matter, and *superior to it*, and in this life connected with a material organization, not only for its manifestation, but also for its discipline and improvement.

As he contemplates the living individual, and beholds him full of activity and vigor, displaying intelligence, speaking, reasoning, and performing his part on the busy theatre of the world, he refers the various phenomena to the connexion of mind with matter. Presently the individual dies. There is the same body. All the parts of the material organization are there. The anatomist cannot discover that any thing is missing. Yet no organ now performs its function. No speech, no motion, no animation is to be perceived there. The eye no longer conveys any impression of light. The ear no longer affords the sensation of sound. What now makes the difference between the *dead* and the *living* man? Let the Phrenologist give the answer to the question. He will reply, — *The spirit is gone.* The mind, or soul, which gave animation to this otherwise lifeless dust, hath broken its connexion with it, and departed to another state. Yes; the Phrenologist will cherish as strong a faith as any other Christian, that the spirit, which is in man, being dependent on a material organization for its *exercise and manifestation* only, in this life, *not for its existence*, is independent of the body's dissolution. Though the body dies, the soul survives, and will

“Flourish in immortal youth,
 “Unhurt, amidst the war of elements,
 “The wreck of matter, and the crush of worlds.”

Gentlemen of the Phrenological Society,

You feel, I trust, the firmness of the ground, on which you stand. You recognize the claims which Phrenology presents to be received as an established science;—as the true philosophy of human nature. You do not pretend by this, however, that you regard it as a *perfect system*. It would be most extraordinary; it would be an anomaly in the history of science, if it were. It was never so pretended by either of its great founders. They acknowledged there were parts which needed further observation. It is not wholly unattended with difficulties; and what great subject is? The science of Astronomy, even, is attended with difficulties. Because there are some

things we *cannot* see, shall we close our eyes against the things we *can*? However incomplete the science may yet be, it has established principles, which will constitute, as we believe, an epoch in the history of man. Its origin is recent; yet its progress has been great, notwithstanding the multiplied obstacles. It has been earnestly received, and ably advocated, by many of the most distinguished physiologists, and by eminent professors in several universities. Especially has it been embraced with ardor by multitudes of minds, which were not wedded to established systems, but were thirsting for a better philosophy.

On the ground of its own evidence, and not upon the strength of numbers or of names, you also, Gentlemen, have embraced it; and you behold in it the true exposition of the varied phenomena of the human mind. It is a science of the noblest nature, and of the utmost importance in its various bearings on the welfare of our race. What philosophy, in point of dignity and value, can be compared to that, which expounds the laws of the human mind, its powers of intellect, its sentiments of morality and religion, its appetites, propensities, and passions,—thus embracing all the constituents and modifications of human character? How universal must be the application of such a science! How clear and satisfactory is its rectification of common errors! Questions, debated for ages by metaphysicians and moralists, are brought to the test of observation and settled. Mere *states* or *conditions* of mind, which have been long mistaken for primitive powers, are shown to be nothing but the *effects of powers*, or the *modes of their activity*. Instead of the doctrine, which has been so generally received since the time of Locke, that the mind is originally like blank paper,—a mere *tabula rasa*,—susceptible of any impression, that all its ideas, and feelings, and impulses, are derived primarily from the external senses; it teaches that all the faculties of intellect and sentiment, not less than propensity, are *innate*, and act *instinctively* and *spontaneously*. The mind is not a mere passive recipient of impressions from abroad; but has innate activity, looks out for knowledge, has decided tendencies previous

to all teaching. It thus explains, what is inexplicable on any other system, the phenomenon of partial genius, — the phenomenon of the natural poet, — the natural painter, — the natural mathematician, — a phenomenon, which is utterly at variance with the theory of a single mental principle having no connexion with organization ; and equally at variance with the supposition of a single mental organ, which must be alike energetic in the performance of all its functions. How easily is this phenomenon explained on the supposition of a plurality of organs, each the seat of its appropriate faculty !

There are original instinctive tendencies in the mind ; and these, Phrenology insists, must be regarded in the business of education. Education must have reference to the direction of the primitive powers. It cannot create ; — it can only cultivate ; and this in accordance only with prescribed conditions. You cannot alter the nature of the plant ; you can prepare the soil, — you can put in the seed, — you can regulate the degrees of moisture and of warmth, — you can prune and train, — and, by observing the conditions which nature has established, you may be able to improve the fruit. So it is in the process of education. Indispensable conditions are established, over which the teacher can have no control. He must act in compliance with these conditions. The faculties may be cultivated, — the activity of some, rather than of others, may be excited, — their organs developed, — their powers increased ; but the faculty, which nature hath not given, we shall look in vain to education to supply.

Various modifications of faculty must be subjected to various training. How many hours have been wasted, nay, worse than wasted, in the attempt to impart the same education to every variety of natural talent ! We must suit our systems of education to the natural faculties ; instead of vainly attempting to make the faculties, which nature has given, bend to our arbitrary systems of education.

How great and beneficial must be the influence of this science in moral education ! It gives the truest insight into

the principles of human nature, and shows most clearly which were designed by the Creator to exercise control. It teaches, that man, though allied by one part of his constitution to the inferior world, is yet possessed of another, which constitutes a very peculiar and distinctive endowment. He has propensities of an animal nature; all necessary to adapt him to his condition in the world, wise and good in their primitive tendencies, and productive of evil only when over-active, or directed wrong. Besides these, he is endowed with intellectual capacities; — which, however, according to Phrenology, are not the highest part of his nature. They are intermediate in the scale. The cultivation of the intellectual powers ennobles the mind, but not in the highest degree. For what is the effect of intellectual cultivation without morals? It increases the capacity of evil, and multiplies the means. Without moral cultivation and moral restraint, it would be better for the intellect to lie neglected. The individual most dangerous to society is he, who, without the restraint of moral principle, has the greatest capacity, and the most knowledge. His means of mischief are multiplied. He will find the way to attain his purposes. The man of the very worst intentions, whose intellect has not been cultivated, is a comparatively harmless being to him, who, without the guidance and restraint of moral principle, has that knowledge which acquaints him with the means, and that capacity which enables him to use them, to carry his intentions into execution. Many are the examples to be found in the world's history of the truth of this; examples of individuals, whose powerful intellects, not being controlled by moral principle, have given them their eminence in crime. Phrenology urges the importance of bearing in mind such facts, in conducting the business of education. It lays the utmost stress upon the principle, — to cultivate the intellect no faster nor farther than the morals.

The sentiments of a moral and religious nature are demonstrated by your science, Gentlemen, to be the peculiar and distinctive endowment of man. Nothing corresponding to them

is found in the brute creation. In man, they also are *innate*, and, like the propensities, act *instinctively* and *spontaneously*. But they need education. They must be cultivated, not independent of, but in conjunction with, the intellect. For the sentiments, not less than the propensities, are *blind*. Their instinctive impulse is without understanding. Of themselves, they have no knowledge of their respective objects, and need, in consequence, the intellect to direct them. Veneration does not know the object to be revered. Cautiousness does not know what is, or what is not, to be feared. They depend on the intellect for information. Without this information they will err. Religious feelings, acting without understanding, have been a fertile source of mischief to the world.

But the application of your science, Gentlemen, will not be less important to other great interests of the human race. How beneficial will be its influence in all the relations of social life ! It will show the endless modifications of human character, and teach the lesson, — not to judge others by ourselves. It will show that mutual forbearance and charity are called for by differences in taste and judgment, which are founded in nature.

Anticipations too sanguine can hardly be cherished of the blessings which will redound to the human family, when the true science of man's nature, in a more perfected state, shall be made the basis of Legislation. Then the complaints which arise from unequal laws will cease ; and human rights will be every where conceded and respected. The ear will be opened to the sighing of the prisoner ; and the rod of the oppressor will be broken. It will throw light upon the true causes of crime ; will infuse a spirit of leniency into the tribunal of justice ; and will show that the discipline of the prison should partake of the character of a kind guardianship, or paternal correction, for the offender's reform, rather than final punishment, to vindicate the majesty of violated law.

Especially will the true science of the mind of man be found to minister beneficially to the *mind diseased*. To the *mind diseased* !—nay ; it teaches that the very *expression* is unphilo-

sophical. An immaterial principle cannot be diseased. Disease is an affection of organized matter. If mind can be *diseased*, will not the startling question be presented, *may not the mind die?* It is not the mind, but the material organ of the mind, that is liable to disease. And Phrenology teaches that this disease is generally *partial*. *Partial Insanity*, so utterly at variance with all received theories of the mind, and so utterly at variance, too, with the theory of a single mental organ, is accounted for by Phrenology, in a manner so satisfactory, as, of itself, to constitute a most conclusive proof.

To the honor of this new philosophy it may be said, that it already has exerted a most happy influence, in improving the modes of treatment pursued towards that numerous and afflicted class, who are the subjects of a diseased cerebral organization. Instead of being regarded as no longer possessing the attributes of humanity, cut off from society, and incarcerated with felons, they are now looked upon with commiseration, and treated with kindness and indulgence. The fountains of human sympathy are opened towards them. Asylums for their refuge are established. They are found capable of much enjoyment in their condition; numbers are engaged in a variety of useful occupations and pleasing recreations; and, upon occasion, the most happy effects are produced by the soothing power of religion.

In fine, what may not be anticipated from the prevalence of the true science of human nature, in conducing to the indefinite improvement of our race? As Phrenologists, you have no faith that human nature is destined to be stationary; or that bars insuperable have been placed to the improvement of the physical organization, in successive generations. On the other hand, you believe, that such laws have been established in regard to hereditary descent, that an essential physical improvement of our race is no visionary anticipation.

There may be, there doubtless are, limits, assigned by the Creator, to the improvement of man; but they are limits, which have never yet been reached,—have never been approximated,—are still far off in the distance,—cannot even be

discerned by the keenest vision. How wonderful is the fact!—the farther man advances on the field of improvement, the wider around him expands his horizon.

How great and glorious must be the change in the aspect of the moral world, when those faculties of man's nature, which were destined to be supreme, shall rise and vindicate their claims! Too long has man, —the spiritual and immortal man, —been a slave to the propensities of his lower nature. To aid him in effecting the great work of moral renovation and moral progress, that true knowledge of his nature which Phrenology affords must be powerfully efficacious.

The energies of the human mind have never yet been directed to this end. The acquisition of power or of wealth has been the object of ambition. How vast is the progress which has been made in the useful and elegant arts! The exact and physical sciences have been carried to great perfection; and the intellect, in consequence, has obtained ascendancy over the moral man. Talent is more regarded than virtue; and greatness rather than goodness receives the homage of the world.

But this view must be wholly changed. The *moral* is the noblest part of man's nature; and to maintain its supremacy, and to promote its progressive improvement, the intellect must be directed.

In this respect it is, that I recognize, with profound satisfaction, a perfect coincidence between this philosophy of human nature, and the doctrine of Christianity; —and I regard this coincidence as among the strongest evidences of the truth of each. Other systems of religion have been suited more to the gratification of the inferior propensities; —but Christianity alone is suited to man's superior sentiments, and the wants and cravings of his spiritual nature.

I have now presented to you, Gentlemen, the thoughts that have occurred to me, upon the claims of Phrenology to be regarded as the science of human nature, and upon some of its important bearings on the welfare of our race. If your views

and feelings are in accordance with my own, you cannot but regard the opportunity, with which you were favored, of hearing the exposition of this science from the lips of Spurzheim, as among the greatest privileges of your life. Like him, you profess to be the students of nature. Adhere to the great principle of your master, the principle of inductive inquiry, as the basis of all scientific investigation. You will not, then, receive, by a blind and implicit deference to authority, what he or any other may have taught; but, by personal observation, you will seek for personal conviction. The book of nature is open wide before you. With fair, unbiassed, independent minds, you have only to read her lessons. Then will you be "*happy*," for you will "*confine yourselves to understand the laws of the Creator, and to find out the means of putting them into execution.*"

and, therefore, in accordance with my own, you cannot but regard the opportunity, which you were favored, of hearing the exposition of the science from the lips of Spurzheim, as offering the greatest privileges of your life. Take him, you propose to be the students of nature. Adhere to the great principle of your master, the principle of inductive inquiry, as the basis of all scientific investigation. You will not, then, receive, by a blind and unphilosophical deference to authority, what he or any other may have taught; but, by personal observation, you will seek for personal conviction. The book of nature is open wide before you. With fair, unbiased, independent minds, you have only to read her lessons. Then will you be "happy," for you will "continue yourselves to understand the laws of the Creator, until ye find out the means of putting them into execution."